United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have been increasingly deployed in many crisis contexts. The practice has been established by the UN to ensure peace and protect victims of different types of armed conflict. Unfortunately, during the past ten years, several cases of serious human rights violations committed by peacekeepers against people who should be protected by them have emerged. The UN has gone through a widespread analysis of the issues involved, from the managerial, administrative and legal points of view. The 2005 Zeid Report has provided the basis for further action within the UN system. Since then, several policy and legal measures have been discussed by relevant UN bodies and organs, and some new developments have taken place. This article offers an account and an analysis of the different steps taken within the UN to face difficult cases of misbehaviour, including human rights violations, which may lead to forms of criminal conduct. It takes into consideration the suggestions provided by the Zeid Report and subsequent UN documents. It focuses on legal developments and discusses the main problems in understanding the legal complexity of this phenomenon. The article includes updated documents and proposals that have been discussed and adopted until the most recent reports in 2009.
Introduction
International organizations (IOs), in particular the United Nations (UN), now regularly deploy international missions known as peacekeeping operations (PKOs).
1 These operations have evolved over time including different and complex activities.
2 Armed forces are deployed in different scenarios and different
Apart from denunciation by NGOs and newspapers, there is an emerging literature on this subject that deserves a certain attention, 9 as there are complex issues involved in the legal discussion of the topic. The present article will focus on the work of the UN in dealing with accountability for crimes committed by peacekeepers and staff working under a UN mandate. The basis for this analysis will be the 2005 Report by Prince Zeid, 10 which identified a series of relevant issues and suggested possible solutions. Legal issues will be looked at through the lens of the report taking into consideration also doctrinal, State and UN practice. This will lead to the discussion of several legal problems regarding appropriate responses to the urgent questions concerning the accountability for human rights abuses and serious misconduct by peacekeepers. Furthermore, this article tries to clarify the legal basis and frameworks under which the misconduct of peacekeepers should be constructed under existing law.
The Prince Zeid Report and the Nature of Crimes
Violations committed by military and civilian components of PKOs have been addressed only rather recently, 11 while the history of PKOs dates back to the 1950s. They have been publicly denounced by NGOs that operate very closely to UN missions in the field. 12 In 1999, Human Rights Watch criticized forms of sexual exploitation in refugee camps, including several cases of child prostitution involving humanitarian organizations' workers in Guinea. 13 In 2001, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children identified cases of violations of women's rights in refugee camps committed by UN personnel, humanitarian operators and NGO staff in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
14 The subsequent report by the UN Secretary-General 15 recognized that forty-three alleged cases of violations of fundamental rights had been verified by the investigation commission established by the UN. 16 All cases included forms of sexual abuse committed in refugee camps, 17 particularly against women. The victims were generally girls aged between 13 and 18 years and perpetrators were members of the civilian and military personnel employed by international agencies.
A second set of violations emerged in 2004 in the context of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 18 Out of seventy-two reported cases against civilian and military personnel, only twenty were considered and six cases were confirmed. 19 The violations included sexual abuse and child pornography, but the consequences were very limited for the staff involved. A UN French civil servant was repatriated, the military personnel were denounced to their national authorities and repatriated. The Office of Internal Oversight Ser-vices (OIOS) report did not mention the countries concerned, mainly to avoid their uneasiness.
The same year, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein was appointed Personal Adviser to the UN Secretary-General to address the problem of sexual abuse perpetrated by UN personnel. 20 Prince Zeid submitted a report entitled 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', 21 which considered four major issues:
(i) the current rules on standard of conduct;
(ii) the investigative process; (iii) the organizational, managerial and command responsibility; and (iv) the individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability.
The suggestions and comments were followed up by a series of measures that will be discussed in the next section.
UN Action
The UN documents discussed in this and the following sections do not properly tackle all the existing legal complexities. It is important to maintain a clear distinction between the proposals for reform and existing legal rules.
The 2000 Brahimi Report, 22 which provided an extensive reconsideration of PKOs, did not refer to violations committed by peacekeepers. However, two months later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, 23 making a special appeal to UN Member States, to the SecretaryGeneral and 'to all parties to an armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians'. 24 The resolution also called 'upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls'. 25 It emphasized 20 See also UN Doc A/59/19 (2005) . 21 'Comprehensive Strategy' (n 10). 22 Brahimi Report (n 7).
UNSC Res 1325 (31 October 2000)
. 24 The resolution refers to 'the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Con- 'the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls'. It also stressed with particular emphasis 'the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions'. 26 The appeal to all parties includes necessarily the UN, so that the same rules and principles should apply to PKOs as well.
Several reports 27 contributed to the elaboration of agreed definitions of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, including a set of recommendations 28 and the adoption of six standards of behaviour to be incorporated in UN and NGO codes of conduct. 29 In March 2002, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 30 established a Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises 31 with the objective of improving the protection of women and children. 32 After a resolution of the General Assembly (GA), which condemned 'any exploitation of refugees and internally displaced persons, especially sexual exploitation', and called 'for those responsible for such deplorable acts to be brought to justice', 33 the Secretary-General adopted the 2003 Bulletin with special provisions aimed at preventing exploitation and sexual abuse. 34 The inition of the expression 'sexual exploitation' 36 and the measures that the UN and other organizations that cooperate with it should adopt.
In 2005, the Special Committee on PKOs 37 adopted a series of recommendations addressing the global strategy for eliminating sexual abuses in PKOs. 38 The report of the Special Committee explains the possible consequences for the personnel, and highlights the positive effects in the reduction of misconduct regarding sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers. A Group of Legal Experts (GLE) 39 provided a report entitled 'Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations'. 40 In 2006 a second GLE was appointed 41 to discuss the binding effects of the 2003 SG Bulletin on contingent members, and the applicability of UN norms of conduct to all categories of peacekeeping personnel. 42 Two main issues were considered: (a) that contingent members are not generally bound by the SG Bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse until the troop-contributing country has concluded and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or other agreement, and (b) UN PKOs may include different categories of personnel (civilian, military and police), which are governed by different rules and disciplinary procedures This implies the need to adopt more consistent rules for the standards of conduct applicable to peacekeepers, which should include clearer obligations for Troup Contributing Countries (TCCs) regarding the conditions for the exercise of their jurisdiction.
The GLE recommended that UN officers and experts on mission who commit abuses 'would never be effectively exempt from the consequences of criminal acts committed at their duty station, nor unjustly penalized, in accordance with due process'. 43 It also proposed a Draft Convention on Crim- 54 for a discussion of the report of the GLE. 55 The GA established an Ad Hoc Committee, 56 which produced two relevant documents. 57 In 2008 the GA adopted resolution 63/119 which reiterated a series of legal measures, including the definition of crimes to be included in national legal systems, and in 2009 considered the GLE report and comments by Member States. 58 Most of the above-mentioned documents will be analysed in the next section of this article.
A. The Measures Proposed and Adopted
On the basis of the above-mentioned reports and documents, 59 the GA envisaged both short-term and long-term measures. The first type of measure is provided in two resolutions, 60 which should be considered together and include:
(i) extension of the criminal jurisdiction of Member States for crimes committed outside their territory by their nationals, officials and experts from the UN peace missions, (ii) cooperation among UN Member States and between them and the UN to pursue the perpetrators of relevant crimes, (iii) judicial assistance in legal proceedings, criminal prosecution and extradition for the aforementioned crimes, (iv) cooperation, pursuant to the national legislation of Member States, in exchange of information and transmission of evidence gathered by the UN in the territory of the Member States which have begun a procedure of prosecution, (v) granting, in accordance with national legislation, effective protection against crimes committed by officials abroad, and (vi) granting of technical assistance to the State which welcomes the peace mission and on whose territory the crime was committed.
The text underlines the need for the UN and its Member States to take urgent, vigorous and effective measures. They include measures that would ensure that offences committed by UN officials and experts in missions do not go unpunished, that their authors are brought to justice in accordance with international law standards, and to ascertain their jurisdiction in the case of serious offences committed by their nationals while acting under UN mandate. The resolutions suggest developing better cooperation between the UN and Member States, with regard to the exchange of information and evidence in the investigation of such crimes. To evaluate the progress in this matter, the UN Secretary-General is asked to provide a report on the basis of the information sent by Member States, 61 including the number and types of serious allegations, and any measures taken by the UN and the Member States.
62 Among relevant developments to implement UN resolutions, it is important to consider the adoption, by the GA, of a revised Model MoU in 2007; 63 and since 2005 the creation of a Conduct and Discipline Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) Headquarters and operating in several missions, 64 with the task of receiving and assessing sexual abuse complaints.
B. The Draft Convention
Among the long-term measures, a project for a new convention represents a possible development in the international legal framework, and a way to provide better coordination for both States and organizations involved. 65 The project is under consideration by the Working Group of the Sixth Committee, which should take into account the views of Member States and the information presented in the 2007 Note of the Secretariat. 66 In that Note, the Secretary-General pointed out that a treaty could enable UN Member States to clarify their competence to investigate and deal with cases of UN officials and experts responsible for human rights violations.
Regarding the competence rationae personae, the 'officials of the Organization of the United Nations' would include also UN volunteers, who are treated as officials under the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). 67 The 'experts on mission' would include military observers, members of the police, civilians and other people of expert status on mission. However, under the existing proposal, military personnel would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Draft Convention. 68 They would still be under the 'exclusive' jurisdictions of the TCC. Regarding the application ratione materiae the Draft Convention would apply to serious offences against persons, including serious sexual abuse, rape and acts of sexual violence, and murder. 69 Issues related to the exercise of jurisdiction are also addressed, as they need further clarification for the proper investigation and prosecution of criminal acts. These provisions have been further discussed in subsequent documents, and they will be analysed in the following parts of this article.
Rules Governing Peacekeeping Operations
The definition of the applicable legal regimes is relevant for the classification and prosecution of certain crimes. However, the UN documents under consideration do not clarify these issues properly. Recent literature also does not 64 fully address this issue. It is impossible here to engage in the definition of the general law applicable to PKOs, 70 but it is relevant to turn the attention to some legal issues that are directly relevant when dealing with crimes committed by peacekeepers, to identify the legal basis for their prosecution. The documents adopted by the UN on the issue of criminal accountability do not clarify the legal basis for the prosecution as they often provide quite general statements on the legitimacy, accountability and good practices of UN missions. However, no clear legal backgrounds are provided. This may be associated with the complex legal regulations of PKOs, and to the unclear position of States in relation to the obligations of their personnel involved in PKOs.
Furthermore, there is a problem with UN accountability, linked to its international legal personality. 71 Acts of UN personnel may be attributable to the organization, with resulting international responsibility for the wrongdoing. However, this is not necessarily the case, as international responsibility is based on international wrongful acts, committed by the personnel and imputable to the organization, and on the 'effective control' test, 72 as required by international case law. 73 This is an issue related to the type of relationship that States and the UN establish with regard to the personnel engaged in the PKO. It depends whether the national contingents and experts are under the 'exclusive' control of the UN or whether the State of origin still exercises some form of control over its nationals working for the UN, which is a matter not completely clarified in practice.
Many of the crimes considered are often associated with forms of sexual abuse and criminal misbehaviour, and not with the conduct of hostilities or the accomplishment of the mission's mandate. Crimes such as sexual abuse, rape, prostitution, murder and bribery, 74 are usually defined in national criminal codes and some of them in international law treaties. The legal basis for punishing those crimes may be based on a complex interrelationship between national and international law.
The legal regulation of PKOs is based on international law, and in particular on the UN Charter. 88 Some of the issues raised by the revised 2007 MoU will be discussed in the relevant following parts of this article.
A. Privileges and Immunities in PKOs
One of the issues that may affect the proper investigation and prosecution of the crimes under consideration is the international system of diplomatic immunities. IOs and their officials enjoy immunities as institutions that operate in the international system as legal subjects. The preamble of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations 89 asserts that 'the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States'. Immunities and privileges recognized in contemporary international law are meant to facilitate activities and functions of foreign agents in the country where they are officially accredited. 84 2007 Revised MoU (n 63) art 7 ter (2). 85 90 Regarding the UN, the issue has been addressed since 1946 by the GA, 91 based on Article 105(1) of the UN Charter, which states that 'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes', and in paragraph 2 that 'Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization'. It is also important to remember that paragraph 3 establishes that 'The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose'. International officials have privileges and immunities similar to those of diplomatic personnel, 92 especially with regard to functions in relation to the goals of the organization for which they act. 93 The question is how these immunities apply to PKOs.
PKOs are designed to intervene in international crises and they are an emanation of the implied powers of the UN. 94 PKOs become subsidiary bodies created ad hoc by one of the principal organs of the UN. 95 In PKOs reference is usually made to Article 105 of the UN Charter on privileges and immunities of the organization and its staff; therefore, staff employed in PKOs enjoy immunities and privileges accorded to the UN. The 1994 Convention prohibits any action against UN and associated personnel, including acts against the person or liberty of UN staff or associated personnel, their private home or means of transport, and against official premises. 'Staff of the United Nations' includes persons engaged or deployed by the UN Secretary-General as members of a UN operation and other officials and experts on mission in the UN or agencies that act in an official capacity. 'Associated personnel' includes those sent by a government or an intergovernmental organization with the agreement of the competent organ of the UN; people working for the UN Secretary-General or a specialized agency; persons deployed by non-governmental humanitarian institution under an agreement with the UN Secretary-General or with a specialized institution carrying out activities in support of the execution of the UN operation's mandate. The Convention does not apply to UN coercive operations authorized by the Security Council by virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter. However, it would apply in most PKOs and would protect UN personnel from actions taken in the context of investigations and prosecution against them.
B. Status of Forces Agreements
Because the 1994 Convention does not directly refer to PKOs, the UN and TCC have adopted SOFAs, which define the rights and obligations of military personnel engaged in each mission, including immunities and privileges. 100 The SOFA currently used by the UN is based on a 1990 model, 101 based on State practice in this field. In the case of criminal conduct of a member of the armed forces, paragraphs 5 and 8 of the SOFA establish that the judicial action remains in the exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC.
Under paragraph 47(a) if 'the accused person is a member of the civilian component or a civilian member of the military component, the Special Representative/Commander shall conduct any necessary supplementary inquiry and then agree with the Government whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted'. If the accused is a member of the military component of the UN PKO, under paragraph 47(b), he or she 'shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in the host country or territory'. The immunity of UN personnel raises problems in relation to the prosecution of those crimes, because States do not easily accept that their personnel abroad should be subject to local or international prosecution, as is clearly evidenced by the position of certain governments with regard to international criminal jurisdictions. 103 In particular, this issue has been the basis of quite complex diplomatic and legal negotiations regarding the exemption from prosecution from International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction, with specific reference to the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), under pressure from the United States. 104 
C. The Nature of the Crimes and the Basis for Prosecution
It may be useful to consider the nature of crimes to identify the possible legal obligations under which individuals should be prosecuted, as they may also identify the competent jurisdiction to deal with those cases. Three types of violation committed by personnel working in UN PKOs may be identified. The first category includes violations of IHL during the conduct of hostilities, generally committed by armed forces engaged in the mission. 105 The second category refers to human rights violations committed by personnel working for the missions, including military, police and civilian components, which relate to possible abuses attached to the accomplishment of the mandate, for instance when using their powers of searching and arresting. A third category, which is the main focus of this article, includes abuses and misconducts that are fundamentally criminal in nature, and are unrelated to the mandate of the mission. They include sexual abuse, rape, theft and other crimes.
The question here is whether they are human rights abuses, criminal conducts, misbehaviour or disciplinary matters. As generally recognized by IHRL, official positions may lead to human rights violations, engaging State responsibility, even if the action was committed by the officer ultra vires. 106 Some acts can be classified as human rights violations, because the perpetrators impinge on the rights of individuals that are defined and protected under IHRL, such as the rights of the child, health and body integrity of the victim of abuse, and are committed either by State officials seconded to the UN, or by UN officers and agents abusing their official position. Under IHRL, State officials are responsible for abuses, linked to the international obligations of their respective State. In the case of UN officers, the UN is not party to international law treaties on human rights, and from the legal perspective, the UN is not bound by treaty law. Furthermore, it has no permanent police and judicial bodies that might investigate and prosecute its own personnel. However, this impasse can be overcome in two ways. Due to the general obligation of the UN to promote and protect human rights under its constitutive Charter, 107 customary law obligations would bind the UN which would be 'constitutionally mandated to promote the advancement of human rights'.
108 It would be then relevant to determine whether certain criminal acts under consideration are now offences under international customary law. The other option is to attribute to the State of nationality of the individual the task of prosecuting the person for violation of IHRL as part of the State obligation under IHRL and as a UN Member State.
The criminal acts trigger the responsibility of their respective State 109 and/or institution with regard to the obligation of respecting human rights. This would bring into action the possible extraterritorial applicability of human rights law when national personnel are acting abroad.
110 This is still a complex issue that is not always appreciated by States that contribute PKO personnel.
However, the various types of violation are not easily identified because the law regulating PKOs is also unclear and it is sometimes difficult to define under which legal framework the criminal act may be framed. 111 In the case of human rights violations, the grounds for prosecution are based on international obligations of States that provide UN personnel, who may retain their jurisdiction over nationals abroad for violation of IHRL and, in some cases, for the prosecution of criminal acts foreseen under their national criminal law. This seems more an issue of competence related to the exercise of jurisdiction, rather than a matter concerning the definition of the applicable law and its qualification as IHRL or criminal law. The documents and reports adopted by the UN on this matter do not clarify those issues. They focus on the disciplinary aspects of the misconduct of UN personnel, rather than on the clarification of responsibility and accountability of States and IOs for the wrongdoings, and for damages to the victims. Under existing rules, the UN peacekeeping force, established under SC or GA mandate, is a subsidiary organ of the organization. For the UN this means that 'an act of a peacekeeping force is, in principle, attributable to the Organization'. 116 The relationship between the UN and TCC is defined in Article 9 of the Model MoU, 117 which outlines the concurrent responsibility of the UN and the State. The UN shall be responsible for damages or loss of property, death or personal injury caused by the personnel or equipment provided by the government 'in the performance of services or any other activity or operation' under the MoU. However, 'if the loss, damage, death or injury arose from gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the personnel provided by the Government, the Government shall be liable for such claim'. 118 This clear-cut distinction is not always possible, because it depends on which entity: State, UN or other organization (ie NATO) exercises effective control over the personnel and over the operation.
In the following sections of this article, several options will be considered, on the basis of UN recommended measures.
Jurisdictional Gaps or Legal Vacuum?
Several UN reports have identified a 'jurisdictional gap' 119 when a crime is committed in a host State that is unable to prosecute the alleged offender, due to its specific circumstances. As PKOs act within a situation of armed conflict or high instability, it is not always possible to provide a proper judicial and investigation system to deal with criminal acts by peacekeepers. If other States, including the TCC, have not extended their criminal jurisdiction to crimes committed in the host State, there could be a jurisdictional gap that may leave the alleged criminal unpunished. 120 However, the lack of willingness by UN Member States to effectively prosecute their personnel involved in alleged criminal acts should not be underestimated. To address, in part, this problem, and some of the legal issues that may create obstacles to proper judicial action, the UN provided a set of options that are analysed below.
A. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae and Peacekeeping Personnel
As mentioned before, different types of PKO personnel are regulated by different rules. The Zeid Report identified at least five categories of personnel: UN staff; UN Volunteers (UNVs); individual contractors and consultants; civilian police and military observers; and military members of national armed forces.
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This subdivision does not facilitate the task of prosecution in cases of alleged criminal offences by peacekeepers. UN personnel are governed by UN Staff Rules and other administrative UN regulations, 122 including the SG bulletins, and also enjoy privileges and immunities under the 1994 UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN. The UNVs working for UN PKOs are regulated by their own rules of conduct, 123 and have been covered by the privileges and immunities that are defined in the 1991 Model MoU. 124 Individual contractors and consultants are regulated by UN standard conditions of contract specified in specific administrative instructions. 125 Under these instructions, they do not have the status of UN officers, therefore they are subject to the local law of the host State, but they can be granted the status of experts on mission when travelling on behalf of the UN. 126 Civilian police and military observers are covered by the privileges and immunities as experts on mission for the UN. As experts on mission they are also subject to the 'Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights Officials and experts on mission are not clearly defined under international law. The Draft Convention contains two possible definitions. One includes 'Members of the United Nations PKO to whom article V or article VI of the 1946 General Convention applies, in whole or in part, pursuant to either the provisions of the status-of-forces-agreement entered into by the United Nations and the host State for the PKO or, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the provisional application of the model status-of-forces-agreement (A/45/594) dated 9 October 1990'. 135 The second option includes official and experts 'who are present in an official capacity in the area where a United Nations PKO is being conducted and who enjoy privileges and immunities of the United Nations pursuant to either articles V and VI of the General Convention, if applicable, or Article [sic!] 105 of the Charter of the United Nations'. 136 This definition seems wider than the previous one, and it adopts the definition given by article 1(a)(i) of the 1994 General Convention.
137 It has been suggested that 'even though the 1994 General Convention does not define experts on mission, these individuals are UN agents but not UN officials'. 138 However, this new classification does not clarify the legal status of those 'agents', with the risk of adding even more uncertainty to an already complex matter, unless it is used to define the issues of individual, State and UN responsibility under international law.
A third category concerns the status of 'formed police units' in PKOs. 139 The GLE noted that there are ongoing discussions on the legal status of those units, but that the members of such units are currently classified as experts on mission and therefore they also enjoy functional immunities.
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There is a problem concerning the identification of the rules applicable to other UN agencies, because their privileges and immunities are not regulated under the UN Charter and the 1994 General Convention, but by specific legal documents, 141 and their immunities may be waived by the heads of their respective organizations. 142 To further complicate the matter, not all States are parties to the 1994 General Convention. In those cases, it has been suggested that the personnel legal status would derive from article 105 of the UN Charter, and that the privileges and immunities defined in the 1994 General Convention, being widely accepted, may constitute the minimum standards for the imple- 143 The GLE suggested including also personnel who are not members of the PKO, but who act for other UN agencies and programmes, in the Draft Convention because the local population would not easily distinguish between the different types of personnel. In a subsequent Note, the Secretary-General supported that option, considering that 'there is no major policy impediment as to why a convention could not apply to cover all persons participating in the United Nations operations, irrespective of the department, office, programme or fund with whom they are engaged'. 144 However, any change regarding the legal status of military observers and police units should also be reflected in their relationship with the UN, and in relation to the host State as defined in the SOFA and in the Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs), to provide a uniform and clear definition of the applicable law.
B. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
As already mentioned before, the discussion on criminal accountability of peacekeepers had started with cases related to sexual abuse. The Zeid Report referred to 'serious misconduct' based on the 2003 SG Bulletin and the Staff Regulations and Rules, which justify summary dismissal from service of a staff member found culpable by the Secretary-General. 145 The subsequent debate on issues of criminal accountability has identified other crimes. Article 3 of the Draft Convention states that a UN official or an expert on mission commits a crime 'if that person intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes one of the serious crimes set out in paragraph 2 of the present article'. The 'serious crimes' listed are 'for each State party establishing and exercising jurisdiction… those which, under the national law of that State party, correspond to: fraud and money-laundering, 146 identified by the Secretariat following the allegations of gold and arms trafficking against MONUC.
147 Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee 148 clarified that the broader range of crimes should be divided into two notionally different sets: 'crimes committed against the general populace and those committed against the Organization itself'. 149 It is not clear whether this distinction would have different legal consequences for the criminal accountability of individuals, or could lead to different procedures of investigation.
Compared with national criminal law, the above-mentioned list is too vague to match the strict standards required under criminal law, 150 even if international tribunals have adopted less stringent standards sometimes. 151 The UN Secretariat pointed out that the Draft Convention should not try to define crimes that are already recognized by all Member States, and there would not be new crimes under international law that might require agreed definitions. However, it should be noted that there are differences in criminal law among national jurisdictions regarding, for instance, the age limits for sexual consent and punishment, prostitution, certain sexual behaviour, such as homosexuality, and rules of criminal procedure.
To avoid further obstacles to the exercise of proper legal action, the GLE suggested that, rather than trying to harmonize criminal law of UN Member States, efforts should focus on 'identifying a matrix of crimes common to most jurisdictions' to avoid impunity. The Secretariat suggested that crimes should be defined 'under the national law of the State asserting jurisdiction and that are punishable under that nation's law by at least two/three years' imprisonment'. 152 To support this position, the UN Secretariat mentioned the example of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition, 153 which defines extraditable offences as those 'which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for a maximum of period of at least one/two year(s), or by a more severe penalty'. 154 In case of uncertainty about the crimes that have been given extraterritorial effect under the Draft Convention, Member States might notify the Secretary-General of such crimes.
The Exercise of Jurisdiction
Issues concerning the effective exercise of jurisdiction are particularly relevant considering the immunity from local jurisdiction. 156 It is clear that criminal acts are not part of the 'official functions' of UN personnel. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that UN officers shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the host State, where the crime was committed. It has been rightly observed that when States have a 'dysfunctional legal system' it may not be in the interest of the UN to agree, under the SOFAs, 'to the host State instituting criminal jurisdiction or to waive immunities or certify the absence of immunity where the host State requests the United Nations to do so'. 157 Despite the fact that this practice seems to conceal forms of impunity, in reality when the local legal system does not provide sufficient guarantees, a criminal action that does not fulfil internationally recognized standards of criminal and procedural law might lead to a violation of human rights of UN officers, in particular the right to a fair trial.
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Another relevant aspect regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by a State is the so-called 'dual criminality' principle. 159 This implies that some States may extend their jurisdiction to acts committed abroad, but only when the conduct also constitutes a crime where it was committed, and vice versa. Several States apply this rule as a prerequisite for extradition and legal assistance in criminal matters. 160 It has been suggested that this precept could be limited 'by encouraging States to review or to adopt a liberal interpretation of their requirements and to co-operate with each other to the maximum possible extent in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel, in particular those involving sexual exploitation and abuse'. 161 However, it is not quite clear, from the legal point of view, how States could 'limit' or 'interpret' their criminal law standards, only in relation to PKOs. 156 See above (n 90). 157 It is a fundamental legal standard that the law applies without discrimination based on the principle of equality before the law. 162 States should define the cases when the 'dual criminality' rule would be applied. A mere 'rule of interpretation' would not meet the criminal law standards of certainty and might be a source of discriminatory treatment. On the issue of dual criminality, Article 5 of the Draft Convention affirms that the definition of States' jurisdiction concerning the identified crimes does not 'impose an obligation on a State party to establish jurisdiction over conduct which does not constitute a crime under the law of the State where the conduct occurred'. However, it would be relevant to clarify which rules under IHRL should be incorporated in national criminal law to punish officials who may commit abuses not yet defined under national law but that may violate rights defined under international law, such as the 1999 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which may set higher age limits compared with national law.
A third issue regarding the exercise of jurisdiction is that some States would not prosecute in the absence of the alleged offender (prosecution 'in absentia'). In those cases, the prosecution could start after the alleged offender is present in the territory of the State that may exercise jurisdiction. This could be facilitated through extradition to secure custody of that person. However, it is well known that there are problems regarding extradition, not only in relation to peacekeeping personnel, as mentioned earlier. These problems are particularly serious when the host State asking for extradition has a dysfunctional legal system. It has been suggested that in these cases, under the rule-of-law mandate of PKOs, the UN should provide assistance to the host State 'to rehabilitate its relevant authorities that are involved in the extradition process, at least in relation to serious crimes'. 163 Even if this sounds a good suggestion, in reality it may take a long time to provide proper training of the judiciary and reforms of the local legal system. Therefore, the reasonable time required for the exercise of criminal prosecution, 164 as part of the fair trial definition, might not be matched. Some States base extradition and cooperation in criminal matters on the principle of reciprocity, particularly in the absence of a treaty defining the type of cooperation. 165 For European States this may also involve compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, regarding the fair trial conditions. 166 Finally, it may be relevant to consider the possible role of the ICC. This option seems more remote and not feasible at this stage, due to the present nature of international crimes defined in the 1998 Rome Statute. 167 The jurisdiction of the ICC would apply only to the most serious crimes, which are defined in its Statute. 168 Despite the gravity of crimes committed by peacekeepers, in particular those with sexual connotations, 169 they seem isolated and sporadic cases committed by individuals, lacking the requirement of crimes against humanity that are 'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack' 170 against the civilian population. The very nature of international crimes, as defined and intended in present international law, is to provide remedies for widespread abuses and violations of human rights and humanitarian law, as part of policy and systematic political and military plans, rather than deal with individual criminal misconduct of isolated individuals. 171 War crimes 172 in the form of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in particular torture or inhuman treatment, 173 and wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body and health, would not need the widespread and systematic requirement. However, it would probably be difficult to consider peacekeepers as parties involved in an international armed conflict, 174 as States would not regard the PKO as fully regulated under IHL for the reasons already mentioned before.
It is also important to remember here that States have concerns regarding the possible exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over their national troops. The case of the United States' strategy towards the ICC, including forms of immunity 175 for its peacekeepers, is quite emblematic to clarify this point. 176 The GLE has defined these crimes as not 'merely ordinary crimes', 177 due to the special responsibility to protect the population where they are deployed.
178 If this may be acceptable in principle, it is also difficult to define a new category of crimes, based on this type of justification. All these issues are further discussed below in relation to specific aspects of States' jurisdiction. The analysis includes the jurisdiction of the host State, the jurisdiction of the sending State, the UN jurisdiction and possible alternatives, such as judicial cooperation, extradition and international jurisdiction.
A. UN Jurisdiction
The UN has clearly affirmed that there are limits to its exercise of jurisdiction. The 2007 Note by the Secretariat underlines the fact that the UN can develop and implement standards and special measures, 179 including the 2003 SG Bulletin, 180 to improve the so-called 'zero tolerance' policy through dissemination, education, pre-deployment and in-mission training campaigns; the establishment of Conduct and Discipline Units in Headquarters and in UN missions, regular patrolling and creation of out-of-bound areas to implement discipline and behaviour. However, it clearly stated that 'the Secretariat cannot hold a person criminally accountable'. 181 The UN can adopt disciplinary sanctions for its personnel, based on administrative investigations, 182 and related to individual behaviour that breaches the standards mentioned before. However, the UN cannot exercise forms of legal jurisdiction to punish criminal actions committed by its own personnel, due to the lack of structures, personnel and funding.
In the 2003 SG Bulletin, violations of standards were defined as 'serious misconduct'. The UN administrative investigation would be carried out only after the applicable code of conduct was identified and the specific behaviour constituted an alleged breach of that code. 183 The only exception to this general rule is when the UN mission has an executive mandate providing governmental powers, including law enforcement and prosecutorial powers in the host State, as in the case of the UN missions in Kosovo 184 and Timor-Leste. 185 Having administrative control over the territory, the UN organs in the field may exercise judicial functions, which should also comply with international human rights standards. Under these circumstances the Secretary-General might have fewer concerns in waiving the immunities of UN personnel. In the Gashi case, 186 related to arbitrary detention in Kosovo, UNMIK decided to compensate the alleged victims after a decision by a panel of international judges in Pristina. 187 However, most PKOs would not have this mandate, because host
States would not easily accept those pervasive powers on their territory. In all other cases, the only possible option is the waiver of immunities by the Secretary-General followed by criminal proceedings by a competent criminal court. For this reason UN bodies have tried 'to identify a State that may be able to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offender and to assess whether the conduct may amount to criminal conduct under the laws of that State'. 188 These options are considered in the following three sections.
B. The Host State Jurisdiction
The GLE affirmed that 'as far as possible, the host State should exercise jurisdiction' 189 on crimes committed in its own territory. This is an undisputed principle based on the principle of sovereignty, and can be exercised 'regardless of the identity of the alleged offender or of the victim, of whether another State can exercise jurisdiction over the same conduct'. 190 Furthermore, there is an obligation for UN peacekeeping personnel to respect all local law and regulations 'as a corollary to their enjoyment of privileges and immunities in the host State'. 191 Article 7 of the Draft Convention adopts this principle, establishing that:
[t]he State party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. 192 There are several advantages in applying this rule because witnesses and evidence are generally located where the criminal act was committed and the investigation can be better carried out, compared with trials conducted abroad, which may imply transfer of witnesses and evidence, leading necessarily to delays and extra costs. Another advantage is the impact on the local population which would perceive a 'greater sense of justice being done and being seen to be done ', 193 an issue that has been pointed out also in relation to the establishment of international criminal tribunals.
188 UN Doc A/60/980 (n 40) para 16. 189 Ibid para 27. 190 Ibid para 27(a). When the host State has a dysfunctional legal system, the GLE suggests that the UN should ensure the interests of the alleged offender, for instance through ad hoc agreements between the host State and the UN before the waiver of immunity. Also, the host State should agree to accept UN assistance to ensure the respect of human rights standards in dealing with the case. 194 This procedure might create a double standard, one for the local population and one for international personnel. The GLE considered that despite reasonable concern regarding this risk, it is already accepted that military contingents are subject to the exclusive foreign jurisdiction, and the consideration is that in those cases, 'some accountability may often be better than none for the victims '. 195 This reasoning has clearly some appeal, but it is based on practical reasons rather than on legal standards, as it is clearly a form of discrimination to impose the application of human rights standards for one group of people, and admit that others, in the same circumstances, would be treated differently within the same jurisdiction and by the same judicial authorities.
C. Hybrid Tribunals
A possible option that could overcome problems related to the exercise of jurisdiction by the host State might be the establishment of hybrid tribunals.
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Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia and the Special Panels for serious crimes established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). 197 The experience of hybrid tribunals is linked to post-conflict situations addressing the prosecution of the most serious international crimes. This would not usually be the case for the crimes under consideration. The GLE suggests that 'hybrid tribunals can be established to deal exclusively with domestic crimes, including those committed by peacekeepers, which do not rise to the level of international crimes'. 198 The identified advantages include the involvement of the international community, which would entail international standards of procedures according to international human rights principles. It would also avoid double standards between peacekeepers and the local population. The same report identifies also two limiting factors: the host State consent to establish such a type of tribunal; and the limitations linked to the financial commitment for UN Member States. The GLE considered that only a few of those principles would be relevant in the case of peacekeeping personnel. In particular it discussed the nationality and universal grounds for jurisdiction. The GLE suggested that all States 'should establish jurisdiction over serious crimes against the person, in particular those involving sexual exploitation and abuse, committed by their nationals in peacekeeping operations'.
(i) TCC jurisdiction
The nationality principle would ensure that when the host State is not able to exercise its jurisdiction, the sending State would conduct the investigation and subsequent prosecution. Furthermore, the exercise by the State of jurisdiction over its own citizens does not require any international agreement, as this is a consequence of the exercise of sovereign powers of the State over its nationals. In 2008 and 2009, the UN Secretariat published a list of replies from Member States regarding their existing laws criminalizing the mentioned crimes. 202 Different rules apply that show some problems in the application of national criminal legislation to nationals abroad. For instance, the Argentinean Penal Code can be applied to offences committed in the national territory, 203 and would not apply to international civil servants, as they are not considered to be gov- ernment agents or employees. 204 Similarly, in the case of Canada, based on the common law tradition, the application of Canadian criminal law is limited to the national territory, the only exception being the possible prosecution of international crimes. 205 In the case of Ireland, serious offences committed by Irish UN personnel in another State would not be prosecuted in Ireland. 206 Some States already allow the prosecution of nationals serving in UN missions. In the case of Germany, 207 Brazil, 208 Sweden 209 and Switzerland, 210 nationals can be prosecuted also when serving for the UN. A quite developed system is foreseen by New Zealand. The 1971 Armed Forces Discipline Act 211 allows for jurisdiction on Defence Forces anywhere, 212 also when acting as members of UN missions.
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The United Nations (Police) Act 1964 establishes the same jurisdiction in the case of UN police units. 214 The more recent Crime and Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Act 2004 would apply to any other citizen who does not fit into the two previous cases, serving in an 'overseas operations force'. 215 The US Uniform Code of Military Justice 216 provides a very detailed set of crimes, including child abuse, 217 sexual harassment, 218 rape, 219 cruelty and maltreatment. 220 It also allows for prosecution of military personnel while on duty and when still enlisted in US military service. 221 Other States, such as Australia, have amended their national criminal law, 222 to incorporate the possible prosecution of their nationals serving abroad under international mandate. Furthermore, some States have specific provisions that extend their criminal jurisdiction when nationals and permanent residents are involved in sexual tourism abroad. 223 These provisions are meant to address that specific issue, but they could be used in the case of sexual abuses by peacekeepers, as criminal prosecution is not limited to civilian personnel only. It seems that different approaches in national criminal law do not help the consistent punishment of nationals abroad who commit offences, nor the determination of national jurisdiction related to international officers and the types of crimes that would fall within the competence of national criminal courts.
(ii) Universal jurisdiction Vis-à-vis universal jurisdiction, the GLE identified both positive and negative elements. Sexual abuse and other related crimes, such as rape and enforced prostitution, are part of the conduct (actus reus) of crimes against humanity, 224 and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 225 In the context of an international armed conflict, fundamental assaults on human health, physical integrity and dignity are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 226 IHL prohibits acts of sexual violence in internal armed conflicts as well. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits 'violence to life and person', 'cruel treatment', 'torture' or 'other outrages upon personal dignity'. Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, governing the protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts, explicitly refers to 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault'. 227 International criminal law also applies to sexual abuses in situations of armed conflict, even if committed for personal motives and not as part of a widespread policy. 228 Also, there is an interesting relationship between the crime of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and forms of sexual violence and abuse, and even enslavement. Some of these crimes may be linked to the alleged cases of trafficking in persons, 229 which have been denounced in some cases. 230 Crimes against humanity can be committed by anyone, even if not affiliated officially to a State and the ICC does not require the link between the act of torture and a public official. 231 In the opinion of the ICC rape and sexual violence may con-stitute genocide, and they can be prosecuted by the ICC under its Statute or by any national court as jus cogens norms. 232 The recourse to international criminal law and to the possible use of universal jurisdiction by any national tribunal would require the jus cogens status of the specific crimes, as they would constitute erga omnes obligations, 233 including the obligation to prosecute their alleged perpetrators, and the obligation to punish or to extradite (aut punire aut dedere). 234 However, it is difficult to affirm that the crimes committed by peacekeepers are so recognized under international law. 235 It should be kept in mind that international crimes are also very narrowly constructed, as they require specific conditions, such as widespread and planned behaviour, which would rarely occur in cases involving peacekeeping personnel in such crimes on an individual basis. It is true that war crimes do not need that specific element, and one rape would be enough to fit it into that category. However, it may be excessive to use the reference to international crimes in the cases under consideration. If they are considered war crimes, an armed conflict, either international or non-international, should be identified. In the case of PKOs it is difficult to define the position of the parties in relation to the local conflict, unless the UN troops do get involved, under their mandate, in the conduct of the hostilities. 236 The position of the GLE in this context is to avoid the need to consider the crimes as international crimes. 237 This may be right, as if they were properly prosecuted by national competent authorities there should not be the need to find complex legal solutions, which are not fully accepted under current international law.
However, there are concerns that certain crimes committed by peacekeepers are not 'merely ordinary crimes', because they are committed against the population that should be protected from abuses and widespread violence. The gravity of those crimes would be based 'on the breach of what is akin to a relationship of trust between the peacekeeper and the member of the community he or she is sent to protect and assist'. 238 Furthermore, there is an argument that the criminal conduct would prejudice the 'credibility of the Organisation and its important role in undertaking peacekeeping operations'. 239 If the second argument is more related to the consequences of the acts, the first one seems to provide more room for legal discussion.
It is true that the position of the peacekeepers is different from that of the local population, as they have certain means and powers that put them in a situation of privilege. However, the reference to the 'trust' is a weak legal justification. It would be better to use more accepted concepts of criminal law to define extra responsibility for the members of UN PKOs. In criminal law there is a concept of aggravating circumstances when certain crimes are committed by people who abuse their power or official authority. Another option would be to consider that they have a 'duty of care', or commit an abuse of position of trust 240 due to their institutional responsibilities, including the responsibility to protect 241 exercised by the international community, which put them in a unique position in relation to the victims and to other people, which makes their crime or misbehaviour particularly odious. This option would provide a clearer base for accountability and it could be included in national criminal provisions concerning national personnel acting abroad in peace operations.
International Judicial Cooperation
In cases under consideration, it is particular important to define forms of judicial cooperation not only among States but also with IOs. Some States already have in place forms of legal cooperation, mainly through bilateral extradition treaties. The Australian Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 242 allows discretionary cooperation with States but not with the UN. 243 Similar provisions exist in New Zealand, 244 which do not bar New Zealand authorities from providing assistance in case of requests from the UN. Other States have manifested a 'willingness' to facilitate investigations and prosecution involving UN personnel and crimes of a serious nature. 245 Some States do not exclude cooperation with the UN but under national criminal law they would not be able to disclose information regarding ongoing investigations. 246 Article 10 of the Draft Convention defines the areas of cooperation, including investigations, criminal and extradition proceedings, and assistance in obtaining evidence. The article clarifies that cooperation shall be based on existing arrangements on mutual legal assistance, and that in the case of absence of such agreements, 'States parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their national law'.
Extradition is a well-established practice of cooperation between States to ensure prosecution of alleged criminals. Extradition treaties define the crimes that can be the object of request for extradition. Article 8 of the Draft Convention suggests that in cases of crimes defined in Article 3, if they are not already included in an extradition treaty, they should be incorporated in existing treaties and in any future treaty. Some States consent to extradition when a treaty is in force with the State formulating the request. In the absence of a treaty, the Draft Convention recommends that States Parties should consider the Draft Convention, once entered into force, as the legal basis for extradition. Nevertheless, certain specific conditions under national 247 and international law, such as fair treatment and trial, based on human rights standards, may still apply.
Other forms of cooperation foreseen by the Draft Convention include the transfer of criminal proceedings between States 'in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice'; 248 the transfer of prisoners in order to complete their sentence in a different country;
249 and cooperation in the context of use of evidence obtained in the host State also in the case of administrative investigation conducted by the UN. 250 Cooperation includes also the fact that the State Party that prosecutes the alleged offender shall communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General, who shall transmit that information to all the other States Parties and to the host State.
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A. Investigation
The Zeid Report bluntly states that 'those who violate United Nations standards need to be punished'. 252 The report identifies some problems in dealing with proper investigation of alleged cases. It is clearly recognized that the presumption of innocence as a general principle of criminal law should apply, in particular by the D PKO, which is usually in charge of a 'preliminary investigation'. The enquiry procedure for civilian police officers and military observers is based on two phases, a 'preliminary investigation' 253 256 Issues related to investigations were addressed in a 2004 OIOS report. 257 For investigation purposes, OIOS has grouped allegations into Category I 258 and Category II, 259 depending on the risk such cases present to the UN. However, the report does not define the meaning of 'risk'. It may represent a danger to the progress of the operation, or a threat to the security of its personnel and infrastructure. The Office of Human Resources Management in the Department of Management may adopt disciplinary measures for UN civilian personnel. Evidence and procedures adopted by the board of inquiry, as an organ of investigation in UN missions, do not follow proper legal and judicial proceedings, and the documentation gathered is not made available because of the UN 'policy of not releasing documents that might be used by third parties to make claims against the Organization'.
260 When allegations of serious misconduct concern military and police personnel, the UN may repatriate the individuals concerned and ban them from future PKOs. However, disciplinary sanctions and any other judicial actions remain the responsibility of the national jurisdiction of the individual involved.
The Zeid Report formulates two main suggestions regarding the investigation procedures. The first one focuses on establishing a more professional in- 254 Misconduct is defined as 'Failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and the Staff Rules or other relevant administrative issuances, or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international civil servant, may amount to misconduct and may lead to the institution of a disciplinary process and the imposition of disciplinary measures for misconduct' (2003) SG Bulletin (n 34) Rule 10.1(a vestigative mechanism, in particular when dealing with criminal allegations.
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The new mechanism might include a permanent professional capacity linked to the DPKO, but maintaining total independence from the command structure of the Department. It could be based on a regional structure, and it would replace the preliminary investigation and the board of inquiry. 262 This would make available a permanent and less expensive structure. It would also provide a professional procedure based on the fundamental rules of criminal law, protecting the rights of individuals who are accused of individual crimes.
Regarding military personnel, the Zeid Report suggests that the TCC should participate in the investigation process. A military lawyer, preferably a prosecutor, with knowledge of national military law, could support the investigation and assist in the collection of relevant material for further national prosecution. This provision should be included in the UN model MoU, which could incorporate the obligation for the TCC to nominate a military prosecutor easily deployable, at short notice, to the mission to assist the DPKO investigations.
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A second suggestion includes the possibility of establishing on-site court martial systems 'for serious offences that are criminal in nature'. 264 This option would facilitate access to witnesses and the acquisition of evidence in the mission area. The report raises some doubts regarding the opportunity of having a court martial in the host State, which might generate some problems. However, this problem seems to be solved under paragraph 47(b) of the Model SOFA, which provides the exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute military components of the mission to the States of origin. According to the report, the establishment of a foreign court martial would be implied in that provision. Nevertheless, the set of investigative powers that could be used in this case is not clear. For instance, whether foreign police officers and investigative authorities could search, arrest and interrogate alleged accused and witnesses, and the forms of cooperation with the local police and the judicial authorities. Those issues should be further defined, as some States might not easily agree to allow foreign investigative and judicial bodies to act on their territory, under foreign authority, and possibly concerning their own citizens.
Rules of criminal procedure are quite detailed in all major legal systems, particularly with regard to the right to a fair trial. It should be noted that such specific rules are not defined in the documents that presently regulate UN personnel. The adoption of international rules of criminal procedure might be a quite complex issue, even if the rules adopted by international criminal jurisdictions could provide a good framework. However, their applicability to UN PKOs might need further negotiations regarding specific rules applicable to them, with a process that would still limit the judicial action with the ratification of UN Member States.
B. Organizational, Managerial and Command Accountability
There is a perception that 'neither the Organization nor its civilian managers and military commanders' show particular efforts and/or are held accountable for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse in PKOs. 265 The Zeid Report provides mainly organizational and managerial suggestions for the running of the missions. Some essential measures include the raising of the awareness among UN and related personnel about sexual abuse, which is defined in the 2003 SG Bulletin.
266 Suggested actions include: intensive training of peacekeepers before, at arrival and during the mission; links to local communities to assist the submission of individual complaints; collection of data concerning abuses 267 and responses by each mission; the possibility of including full-time personnel conduct officers, on the examples of operations in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the DRC and Haiti; and an increase in the number of female military personnel, including at senior level, to discourage sexual exploitation. 268 Some provisions already exist in this area of concern, such as the prohibition, under UN standards of conduct, 269 of sexual activity with prostitutes. However, the report identifies a problem when peacekeepers are provided with condoms under action by the DPKO and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS. Therefore a confused and contradictory message seems to be passed to the personnel. Clearer messages should be sent to soldiers, taking into account the 2003 SG Bulletin. Also early warning information should be used by managers in missions to identify possible abuses, and the use of more established and professional units by TCCs might improve the behavioural standards in each mission.
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The new model MoU includes a series of relevant obligations. They include the obligation for governments to inform its personnel of the UN standards of conduct, 271 to impose clearer obligations on commanders of national contingents regarding disciplinary matters, 272 and addresss issues of investigation, 273 exercise of jurisdiction by governments 274 and accountability of personnel.
C. Individual Disciplinary, Financial and Criminal Accountability
There have been some cases in which national authorities have penalized their personnel, under their military and/or criminal justice systems, who have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse, including dismissal from the military, custodial sentences and loss of rank. 276 France, for example, has reportedly imprisoned one of its peacekeepers for filming himself having sex with children, while countries including Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa and Tunisia have announced disciplinary action against some of their peacekeepers. 277 The government of Morocco convicted four soldiers serving as UN peacekeepers for engaging in trafficking. 278 The problem identified in the Zeid Report is the widespread perception that members of PKOs who commit sexual abuses 'rarely if ever face disciplinary charges for such acts and, at most, suffer administrative consequences'. 279 It is particularly worrying that the Report affirms that 'such perceptions are not without foundation'. 280 There are several reasons that in, part, justify this situation. Some have been mentioned before, regarding the investigation procedure. Two other reasons are mentioned in this section: (i) the reluctance of States to admit that their troops commit such crimes, and (ii) the lack, in many areas where UN personnel are employed, of a reliable legal system, that could permit local prosecution, after the UN Secretary-General had waived the immunities of staff accused of serious offences. 281 Due to this complex situation, the report provides a set of options based on disciplinary, financial and individual criminal accountability.
Regarding disciplinary measures, there may be different types of sanctions, depending whether the personnel are UN staff or military members of national contingents. UN staff who violate the 2003 SG Bulletin standards should be subject to disciplinary action, unless the Secretary-General accepts 'an immediate resignation' and the individual concerned would be never re-employed by the UN. 282 These provisions are based on Staff Regulations and Rules, which give these powers to the Secretary-General as head of the UN administration. 283 Regarding similar violations by civilian police, military observers and other civilian personnel the Report suggests that their contracts should be terminated. For military personnel, the Report suggested an amendment to the model MoU to include a clear obligation for TCCs to institute disciplinary action and appropriate legal proceedings, a measure later adopted in 2006.
Financial accountability is also taken into consideration, not only as a form of sanction, but as a means to provide assistance to acknowledged victims. 285 The Report mentions the so-called phenomenon of 'peacekeeper babies', who result from relationships between local women and UN peacekeepers. Recommendations are based on existing UN Staff Rules which permit the imposition of fines on staff members who are guilty of misconduct. The suggestion is that fines imposed for violations of the 2003 SG Bulletin should be sent to a voluntary Trust Fund for Victims to provide assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. 286 Amendments should be added to relevant documents to extend these measures to civilian police and military observers. 287 For national military contingents, the report suggests that the daily allowance of soldiers found guilty of sexual crimes should be collected through national authorities, 288 so that financial support could be provided to the victims. It is stressed, under the 1999 SG Bulletin on 'Family and Child Support Obligations of Staff Members', 289 that the UN is authorized to honour court orders against UN staff members for family support. 290 In this case Section 2.2 of the 1999 SG Bulletin clearly affirms that:
In accordance with staff regulation 1.1 (f), the privileges and immunities of the United Nations are conferred in the interests of the Organization and furnish no excuse to staff members who are covered by them for the non-performance of their private legal obligations.
This provision indicates that certain limitations to immunities and privileges of the UN staff are allowed, and they impose duties on UN staff that can be implemented under the law. The report also suggests practical measures to support and assist the mother of a peacekeeper baby. They include the request of a DNA test for UN staff, and in the case of a positive result, the possibility of financial help deducted from the UN staff member at dismissal, 291 based on his salary income, pension or other financial sanction that can be applied by the State of nationality. In the case of military contingents, the report suggests that the UN should provide help for mothers to file claims that would be transmitted to the TCC for consideration in its legal system. 292 MoU provides that military personnel in PKOs are subject to the exclusive criminal authority of the TCC. 293 However, under the practice established by the Model UN SOFA, States should provide formal assurances that they would exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed in the mission area. 294 The Report regrets that the practice mentioned 295 is no longer used by the UN, and it should be clearly reinserted to guarantee a legal obligation for States towards the UN.
In general, the Zeid Report underlined the lack of support in the investigative part by different components of the mission. The enquiry revealed problems of transparency and affected genuine cooperation by States. It is important to note that this attitude does not help the cause of justice and to clarify the responsibility of those individuals responsible for grave abuses. The Report suggests a set of possible remedies. First of all the Special Committee should request the Secretary-General to obtain formal assurances regarding the exercise of their jurisdiction when a DPKO investigation has well-founded allegations against a military member of a mission. 296 Secondly, if national authorities do not prosecute, they should submit a report to the Secretary-General explaining why prosecution was not appropriate. Thirdly, that the GA makes this procedure 'an essential condition for acceptance of an offer from a troop-contributing country to supply troops to the UN'. 297 Finally, to monitor the compliance with the mentioned rules, the Secretary-General should indicate, in its annual report to the Special Committee the actions taken by troop-contributing States, and in a separate part of the report indicate the details of cases that were not properly addressed, indicating the name of the contributing country, without revealing the identity of individual members of the contingent. 298 The report considers that these measures would show that the UN and States do not 'tolerate acts of sexual exploitation and abuse by military members of their contingents'.
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Since 2007 the Secretary-General has submitted a report to the GA regarding data on investigations into sexual exploitation and related offences. 300 In 2007 the GA adopted a 'Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel', 301 'to ensure that victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff and related personnel receive appropriate assistance and support in 293 2007 Revised MoU (n 63) art 7(1) quinqiens. 294 
Conclusions
The UN is actively adopting new measures to address misconduct by peacekeepers that amount to criminal acts. It is very important to identify and prosecute individuals who are responsible for violations that infringe fundamental rights, not only to ensure the consistent action of UN missions, but also to avoid tensions with local communities that may compromise the success of a PKO. The purpose of PKOs, in the context of either the UN or other international organizations, is to protect individuals in situations of extraordinary suffering. 304 As pointed out by Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, the UN would lose 'its moral force if it fails to respond when those within the United Nations system violate human rights'. 305 Furthermore, there is a risk that the UN and other IOs that do not address the issue of immunities in cases of human rights violations might be considered to be authorizing such violations, in particular when victims are not provided access to adequate remedies. 306 Some cases have already pointed out the importance of addressing the system of international immunities with regard to responsibility of IOs. 307 The analysed documents make special reference to enhancing cooperation between States and the UN, and reaffirm the general obligations to respect the principles of international law related to the protection of human rights. Actions include policy-oriented strategies, administrative powers of control exercised by States and by UN bodies, and the fundamental willingness of States to exercise jurisdiction in alleged cases of crimes committed by nationals who serve in UN PKOs. This would also include strengthening training activities for staff who are sent to peace missions. 308 Training should inform about legal limitation of immunities, the State's jurisdiction, the defini-tions of crimes, the criminal consequences and the fundamental guarantees that alleged perpetrators must enjoy.
Several measures should be adopted to clarify the legal uncertainties that still surround the practical prosecution of UN personnel in cases of misbehaviour. Due to the lack of UN police and judiciary, there is a need to clarify and implement the obligations of Member States in dealing with the investigation and prosecution, rather than codify new rules. The crimes and misbehaviour of UN peacekeepers should be identified, probably through a relevant UN body, such as the DPKO. The acts under consideration identified as misbehaviour are essentially of a criminal nature. They may not reach the qualification of international crimes, but there would be no need to use this option if States applied standard criminal law effectively. However, the role of international criminal courts should be considered only as a subsidiary option, and only for those crimes that have been internationally defined, such as torture. Even in that case, the possible prosecution by international courts, including the ICC, seems too remote and illusory.
Once the UN competent bodies have identified the types of crime that should be prosecuted, States contributing personnel for PKOs should include them in national criminal law, in military criminal codes, and should define the exercise of national jurisdiction on crimes and misbehaviour committed by nationals while serving in peace operations of international organizations. A second national measure would be the clarification of extradition and judicial cooperation among States and the UN when dealing with the prosecution of those crimes. Some clarification should also be provided regarding the possible deadline for prosecution and the possible consequences in case of failure to investigate and prosecute to avoid forms of hidden impunity.
A special burden should be put on commanders of national contingents, because in cases concerning military and police personnel, these issues should be part of the disciplinary measures under the responsibility of national officers in the field. The revised 2007 MoU includes some improvements, providing an obligation for each commander of a contingent with the authority to ensure compliance with UN standards, local laws and regulations. 309 However, there are no clear consequences for the commander who does not act properly. Reforms of the SOFAs and SOMAs between the national State and the host State should include realistic and feasible mechanisms for the prosecution of UN PKO personnel in case of alleged violations.
At international level, the Draft Convention might provide some further assistance. However, it would be relevant to clarify the issues of limitations on immunities for UN personnel, and the procedure for dealing with cases of criminal conduct, in the case of inaction by the State of nationality of the individual. When certain criminal acts also imply human rights violations, it would be relevant to clarify the level of responsibility of the UN and of the sending State. This which could recommend implementation-oriented mechanisms. Of course, not all misconducts are human rights abuses, and those acts would occur outside the territory of the State involved. However, with regard to human rights violations, this might help the international scrutiny regarding national compliance with human rights law, including the extraterritorial application of human rights norms, and it would underline the UN commitment to enforce and protect human rights as part of its mandate under the Charter.
It should be stressed that misbehaviour and criminal conduct should be dealt with primarily by appropriate criminal and disciplinary measures. If members of national contingents and UN personnel were investigated and prosecuted without delay, the risk of misbehaviour would probably be reduced. One of the functions of criminal law is the prevention of crime through the certainty of the sanction. From the information now available, it seems that abuses by peacekeepers have been ignored for too long, leaving room for the presumption of impunity hidden under immunity. There is now a significant awareness and international concern on this matter and the UN seems to take it seriously. More action and cooperation are needed by Member States, who cannot complain about the inefficiency of the UN when they themselves are not using appropriate national judicial mechanisms to deal with the criminal behaviour of their officers and citizens. 
